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Risman & Risman, Attorneys at Law

They Never Said No. In New York City, That Can Be the Violation.

By Risman & Risman, P.C. ·

You sent the email in March. You said your condition was making a specific part of the job hard, and you asked whether something could be adjusted. Your manager said she would look into it.

Nothing happened. Nobody said no. Nobody said yes. There was a meeting that got moved twice, and then it stopped being mentioned, and you went back to doing the job the way you had been doing it, worse than you used to, until the review came around.

If you work in New York City, the silence is not a gap in the story. It may be the story.

This article covers New York City and New York State, with notes on federal law and New Jersey. It is general information, not advice about your situation.

The rule most people have never heard of

In 2018, the City Council amended the New York City Human Rights Law to add what it called a cooperative dialogue. The provision is Administrative Code § 8-107(28), added by Local Law 59 of 2018, enacted January 19, 2018, and effective October 16, 2018.

It makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer “to refuse or otherwise fail to engage in a cooperative dialogue within a reasonable time with a person who has requested an accommodation or who the covered entity has notice may require such an accommodation.”

A cooperative dialogue is defined in § 8-102 as “the process by which a covered entity and a person entitled to an accommodation, or who may be entitled to an accommodation under the law, engage in good faith in a written or oral dialogue concerning the person’s accommodation needs; potential accommodations that may address the person’s accommodation needs, including alternatives to a requested accommodation; and the difficulties that such potential accommodations may pose for the covered entity.”

Two things in that definition get overlooked. The dialogue has to cover alternatives, not only the thing you asked for. And it has to cover the employer’s difficulties, which means the employer has to actually say what the problem is rather than keep it to itself.

Then there is the part almost nobody knows about. Under § 8-107(28)(d), after the dialogue concludes, the employer must give you a written final determination identifying any accommodation that was granted or denied.

Not a conversation. Not a shrug. A document.

This is not just a disability rule

The cooperative dialogue requirement covers four categories of accommodation requests. The disability cases get nearly all the attention, and the other three are where people are most often caught unaware.

Disability, under subdivision 15. Religious needs, under subdivision 3. Needs related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition, under subdivision 22. And needs as a victim of domestic violence, sex offenses, or stalking, under subdivision 27.

The religious cases are not hypothetical. In Moye v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 248 A.D.3d 623 (1st Dept 2026), practicing Muslim maintenance workers who wore beards were told to shave to pass an N-95 fit test. The First Department held that a jury could find the hospital’s response was not a cooperative dialogue.

You do not have to file anything

The statute is triggered by a request or by notice that you may require an accommodation. The second half does the work.

Under § 8-107(15)(a), the employer’s accommodation duty applies where the disability “is known or should have been known” by the employer. The First Department has held that an employer’s awareness triggers a duty to engage in a good faith interactive process “even in the absence of a specific request” (Friedman v. Bloomberg, L.P., 230 A.D.3d 1060 [1st Dept 2024], quoting Estate of Benitez v. City of New York, 193 A.D.3d 42, 48 [1st Dept 2021]).

In Friedman, the employee told her supervisors that her dyslexia made writing social media copy difficult. That was enough. There was no form and no magic words, and the court held the employer could not get summary judgment.

So if you told your manager that you were struggling with a specific task for a specific reason, you may have started a clock you did not know existed.

There is still a threshold. The duty runs toward a person who is or may be entitled to an accommodation, and a trial court has held that nothing requires an employer to begin a cooperative dialogue until the employee shows that much. Telling your employer you are unhappy is not the same as telling it that something about your condition, your faith, your pregnancy, or your safety is colliding with a specific part of your job.

What the dialogue has to look like

There is no required number of meetings and no requirement that you get what you asked for. The First Department said so directly in Hosking v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, 186 A.D.3d 58 (1st Dept 2020): there is no rule that an employer has to engage for a certain number of days, or that it ultimately has to give the employee what the employee is demanding.

What it cannot do is decide first and talk afterward.

In Hosking, the employer concluded the employee could not perform a consolidated position and told her to apply elsewhere internally. The court held that even if a jury might ultimately agree she could not do the job, the employer “cannot jump to that ultimate conclusion without first engaging in a good faith interactive process.” The essential functions of the job have to be part of that process, the court said, “not a unilateral employer decision cloaked by business judgement.”

That principle is now in the statute. Section 8-107(28)(e) provides that a determination that no reasonable accommodation would let you satisfy the essential requisites of the job may only be made after the parties have engaged, or the employer has attempted to engage, in a cooperative dialogue.

Moye shows the other common failure. The employees there were given a choice between violating their religious beliefs and accepting a transfer, and told that refusing the transfer would be treated as a resignation. The court held a reasonable jury could find that this process, “under the specter of forced resignation,” was not a cooperative dialogue. It also held that accepting an accommodation as the only alternative to forced resignation does not categorically preclude an employee from later claiming the accommodation was unreasonable or that no cooperative dialogue was provided.

If you took the transfer because the alternative was losing your job, you did not waive anything.

Your half of it

The statute defines the dialogue as a process in which the employer and the person “engage in good faith.” That is two-sided, and it is the part of this subject that plaintiff-side writing tends to leave out.

Courts look at whether the employee answered questions, supplied the information that was asked for, and identified what specifically could not be done. An employee who goes silent, refuses to give the employer anything to work with, or walks away the moment the first answer is not the one they wanted can lose a claim that would otherwise have been good. In Goolsby, discussed below, part of what sank the claim was that the employee had been given a real process and used all of it.

None of that requires you to accept what you are offered. It requires you to stay in the conversation and keep a record of it.

What it is actually worth

Here is where I want to be careful, because this gets oversold.

Start with the strongest case. On October 15, 2026, the First Department decided Kocher v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 2026 NY Slip Op 06007, 2026 WL 3079051. The employee had managed more than eighty people in IT. He was hospitalized for nine weeks, became disabled, and asked for long-term disability leave. The employer did nothing to engage him about accommodation.

The court granted the employee summary judgment on his City Human Rights Law cooperative dialogue claim. Not a trial. Judgment, on liability, for the employee, because the record presented no issue of fact about the employer’s failure to engage once it knew of his condition.

Summary judgment for the employee on liability is an unusual posture in an employment case. That is what makes the decision worth reading.

Now the limits, which the same decision supplies.

Kocher’s reasonable accommodation claims were not resolved. They went back for trial, in part because there was evidence he may have been unable to work at all, with or without an accommodation. Winning the dialogue claim did not win the accommodation claim, and the accommodation claim is usually where the lost wages are.

The claims are deliberately separate. Section 8-107(28)(f) says the cooperative dialogue obligations are supplemental to and independent of the accommodation duties, and that complying with the dialogue requirement is not a defense to a claim of failing to provide a reasonable accommodation. That provision cuts in the employee’s favor. But independence runs both ways.

And the claim can be lost. In Goolsby v. City of New York, 236 A.D.3d 404 (1st Dept 2025), the court affirmed dismissal of a cooperative dialogue claim because the City’s process for reviewing accommodation requests, including an appeal the employee pursued, satisfied the requirement. The First Department reached the same conclusion about the Fire Department’s vaccine accommodation process in Ansbro v. Nigro, 235 A.D.3d 525 (1st Dept 2025), where firefighters were told how to apply, how to appeal, and were given explained denials.

An employer with a real intake process, a named reviewer, and an appeal is usually going to survive this claim. The cases employees win are the ones where nobody did anything.

As for the written determination specifically: the statute requires it. I am not aware of an appellate decision holding that the absence of one, standing alone, supports its own claim, and at least one trial court has read the provision as requiring the determination without requiring a written justification for it. Its practical value is different and still substantial. A missing written determination is a clean, dated, documentary fact about a process the employer will later describe as thorough. It is very hard to argue about.

New York State and federal law

The State Human Rights Law requires an interactive process too, and skipping it hurts the employer. In Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824 (2014), the Court of Appeals held that “in all but the most extreme cases, the lack of a good faith interactive process forecloses summary judgment in favor of the employer.”

But the Court drew a line that matters here. It rejected the idea that the interactive process is an independent element which, if missing, automatically entitles the employee to judgment, and said plainly that “the employee cannot obtain a favorable jury verdict or summary judgment solely based on the employer’s failure to engage in an interactive process.”

Under State law, in other words, the employer’s silence keeps your case alive. It does not win it.

That is the precise thing Local Law 59 changed for New York City, and Kocher is what the change looks like in practice. The First Department has held that failure to engage is independently actionable under the City law.

One more piece of Jacobsen survives everywhere: at trial on a State law claim, “the plaintiff employee still bears the burden of proving the existence of a reasonable accommodation that would have enabled the employee to perform the essential functions of his or her position.”

Federal law is weaker still. The EEOC’s regulation says only that “it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation,” and that the process “should” identify the precise limitations and potential accommodations. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). May, and should. No writing, and no separate federal claim for skipping it.

Who is covered

For most purposes, the City law reaches employers with four or more employees. The job must also connect to the city: a nonresident must plead and prove that the discriminatory conduct had an impact within New York City. Hoffman v. Parade Publications, 15 N.Y.3d 285 (2010).

That matters more than it used to. If you live in New Jersey and work remotely for a company headquartered in Manhattan, whether the City law protects you is a real question, not an assumption.

The Court of Appeals softened one edge of this in 2024. In Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., it held that the City and State Human Rights Laws protect nonresidents who are not yet employed in the city or state but who proactively sought an actual city-based or state-based job. So a nonresident who was denied a New York job, including an internal transfer into one, is not outside the law simply for living elsewhere.

New Jersey

New Jersey requires an interactive process, but it comes from the courts rather than from a statute, and it looks different.

The regulation itself, N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b)(2), says only that an employer “shall consider the possibility of reasonable accommodation before firing, demoting or refusing to hire or promote a person with a disability on the grounds that his or her disability precludes job performance.” It does not use the phrase interactive process, and it requires nothing in writing. The interactive process obligation comes from Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of the Superior Court, 351 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 2002), which adopted the federal standard and held that no specific request and no magic words are needed.

New Jersey does have Richter v. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021), where the Supreme Court held that an adverse employment action is not a required element of a failure-to-accommodate claim under the Law Against Discrimination. The Court said an employer’s “inaction, silence, or inadequate response to a reasonable accommodation request is an omission that can give rise to a cause of action,” and that the failure to accommodate is itself an actionable harm, though the absence of consequences may affect damages.

So in New Jersey you do not need to be fired to have a claim. You just will not have a written determination to point to, because nothing required one.

The deadlines

A civil action under the City Human Rights Law must be brought within three years, and that period is tolled while a complaint is pending before the City Commission on Human Rights or the State Division of Human Rights. Administrative Code § 8-502(d).

A complaint with the State Division of Human Rights must be filed within three years of the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice. Executive Law § 297(5).

Which date starts the clock is its own fight, and it is usually earlier than people expect. It tends to run from the employer’s act, not from the day you understood what the act meant.

One warning that costs people their cases. Filing an administrative complaint generally bars you from suing in court on the same grievance, under both Executive Law § 297(9) and Administrative Code § 8-502(a). There are exits, including a dismissal for administrative convenience, but they are not automatic, and you do not control them. Choosing the agency is choosing a forum, not adding one.

What to do

Put the request in writing, even if you already made it out loud. One email describing the difficulty and what might help. You do not have to name a diagnosis or use the word accommodation.

Ask for the written determination by name. A short line is enough: “Please provide the written final determination required by Administrative Code § 8-107(28)(d).” Either you get a document that tells you where you stand, or you get nothing, and the nothing is dated.

Write down the dates. When you first raised it, who you told, what they said, when meetings were scheduled and cancelled. The question is whether the employer engaged within a reasonable time, and that question is answered by a calendar.

Keep a copy outside the company’s systems. Forwarding company documents to a personal account can create its own problems. Contemporaneous notes you wrote yourself do not.

Do not read silence as an answer. Waiting politely is the most common mistake here. The obligation to respond within a reasonable time is the employer’s. The three-year deadline is yours.

The bottom line

In most places, if your employer never responds to an accommodation request, you have a frustrating story and a difficult case about what would have happened.

In New York City you may have something narrower and more useful: a statutory obligation that was not met, a document that was never produced, and a claim that a court has been willing to decide in the employee’s favor outright.

It is not the whole case. It is the part of the case that does not depend on anyone’s memory.

Ask for the determination in writing. Note the date you asked.

This article is general information, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Whether any of this applies depends on facts specific to your situation, including where you work and what your employer actually did. If you have asked for an accommodation and gotten no real answer, talk to an employment lawyer before your deadlines run.